The California Supreme Court recently
delivered two blows to the once seemingly impenetrable cloak
of confidentiality protecting peace officer personnel
information from public disclosure. In two separate
decisions, the Supreme Court held that Penal Code section
832.7, which provides that “peace officer personnel records”
are confidential, did not prevent disclosure of certain
personnel information in response to California Public
Records Act[1]
(“CPRA”) requests by the news media.
In Commission on
Peace Officer Standards and Training v. Superior Court (Los
Angeles Times Comm., L.L.C.)[2]
(“Los Angeles Times”) the Supreme Court ruled that
information in a State database containing officers’ names,
employing departments, and hiring and termination dates is
subject to disclosure under the CPRA. Also, in
International Federation of Professional and
Technical Engineers, Local 21, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court
(Contra Costa Newspapers, Inc.)[3]
(“Contra Costa Newspapers”) the Supreme Court ruled
that names and salaries of public employees earning $100,000
or more per year with overtime, including peace officers,
are subject to disclosure and not protected under the CPRA.[4]
The two cases do not merely have academic value, but may
significantly impact how law enforcement agencies respond to
media requests for information, including disclosures made
following critical incidents such as officer-involved
shootings.
The Statutes
The Legislature enacted the CPRA
in 1968 proclaiming that: “access to information concerning
the conduct of the people’s business is a fundamental and
necessary right of every person in this state.”[5]
Under the CPRA, the public is entitled to inspect public
records unless the requested records are specifically
excluded from inspection.[6]
Exempt records include those that are otherwise protected by
federal or state law[7]
as well as “[p]ersonnel, medical, or similar files, the
disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy.”[8]
Penal Code section 832.7, passed in 1978, provides that
“peace officer personnel records . . . or information
obtained from these records” are confidential. Penal Code
section 832.8 defines a “peace officer personnel record” as
“any file maintained under that individual’s name by his or
her employing agency and containing records relating to . .
.” personal data; medical history; election of employee
benefits; employee advancement, appraisal, or discipline;
complaints; or “[a]ny other information the disclosure of
which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy.”[9]
The overriding issue in Los
Angeles Times and Contra Costa Newspapers was
whether Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8 protected basic
information about peace officers from disclosure under the
CPRA.
The Los Angeles Times Decision
In Los Angeles Times, a reporter
requested that the California Commission on Peace Officer
Standards and Training (“POST”) release information in its
database regarding all new peace officer appointments from
1991 to 2001. Specifically, the reporter requested
officers’ names, employing departments, appointment dates,
and termination dates.[10]
The Times reporter intended to study the movement of peace
officers between various departments to detect any
meaningful trends.[11]
The Times reporter was interested, for example, in
understanding whether and why peace officers may be hired by
one agency after being fired by another agency.[12]
POST denied the records request claiming that
Penal Code section 832.7 protects from disclosure all peace
officer personnel records.[13]
The Times then filed a petition for writ of mandate in the
Superior Court. The Superior Court ordered POST to release
to the names, appointing agencies, dates of appointment, and
termination dates of each officer.[14]
POST appealed and the Court of Appeal directed the Superior
Court to enter a new judgment denying the Times’ request in
its entirety.[15]
The Supreme Court granted review.
The Supreme Court concluded that the
Legislature did not intend information to be treated as
confidential solely on the basis that the information could
be found in a “personnel file,”[16]
even one protected under Penal Code sections 832.7 and
832.8.[17]
In other words, the location where information is stored is
not the controlling factor in deciding whether it is
confidential. The Supreme Court indicated that such an
interpretation of Penal Code section 832.7 would lead to
absurd results, such as rendering confidential a newspaper
article praising or criticizing an officer simply because
the newspaper article was placed into the officer’s
personnel file.[18]
The Supreme Court discerned no intent by the Legislature to
make confidential either the identities of peace officers or
basic employment facts.[19]
Rather, the Supreme Court concluded that confidentiality
only extends to the specific records enumerated in Section
832.8.[20]
Thus, the Supreme Court then proceeded to analyze whether
the types of information sought by the Los Angeles Times
reporter were the types of information enumerated in Penal
Code section 832.8.
POST contended that peace officers’ names,
employing agencies, and hiring and termination dates do
constitute personnel records because they constitute
“employment history ... or similar information.”[21]
However, the Supreme Court held that the protection for
“employment history” information under Penal Code section
832.8(a) only extends to information concerning an officer’s
previous employment.[22]
Because POST records are obtained from the employing
department regarding an officer’s current status,
information in POST’s possession was not protected as
“employment history” because the information was current at
the time it was collected.
Next, the Supreme Court discussed whether
officers’ names should be considered “personal data” under
Penal Code section 832.8(a). The Court referred to the
definition of the word “personal” finding that the term
carries a connotation of privacy. Noting that officers
routinely identify themselves when they make arrests, sign
police reports, and wear badges or nameplates with names or
identification numbers, the Court concluded that officers’
names were not “private” and as such were not “personal
data” under the statute. Thus, in finding that names are
not protected as “personal data” and that employing
departments and appointment and termination dates do not
constitute “employment history,” the Court found that the
information requested by the Los Angeles Times reporter was
not privileged pursuant to Penal Code section 832.7 as
“peace officer personnel record” information. In
rationalizing its statutory construction, the majority noted
that the Court “may assume that in defining personnel
records the Legislature drew the line carefully, with due
concern for the competing interests. Had the Legislature
intended to prevent the disclosure of officers’ identities
as such, an obvious solution would have been to list ‘name’
as an item of ‘[p]ersonal data…’”[23]
Having concluded that the Penal
Code does not protect the information sought by the Los
Angeles Times reporter, the Court then addressed the
question whether the CPRA’s provision preventing disclosure
of “[p]ersonnel, medical, or similar files, the disclosure
of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy”[24]
applied to the information sought. The Court noted that
this exception to the policy favoring disclosure of public
records requires a court conduct a balancing test of the
competing interests of peace officers on the one hand and
the public on the other.
The Court began its analysis from
the assumption that: “[t]he public’s interest in the
qualifications and conduct of peace officers is
substantial…”[25]
The Court then turned the specific request for information
itself, noting that the request by the Los Angeles Times was
legitimate, in that the information was sought to determine
such important information as whether inappropriate
employment practices were occurring and whether officers who
are dismissed from one or more agencies are nonetheless
hired by another.[26]
Not surprisingly, the Court found
that information about where a peace officer has served is
not likely to cause unwarranted embarrassment or indignity
to the officer. Describing the information being sought as
“innocuous information,”[27]
the Court focused on whether POST could show that releasing
the information would constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy. POST argued that releasing such
information causes “potential for mischief,”[28]
may cause a safety hazard to the involved officers, and may
be used to harass officers.[29]
Rejecting these arguments as “purely speculative,”[30]
the Court ruled that the privacy and safety interests of
peace officers do not outweigh the public’s interest in the
disclosure of the information.[31]
Importantly, the Court noted that
there may be certain officers, such as those who work in
undercover assignments, who have a heightened need to keep
information from being disclosed.[32]
As such, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings
in the Superior Court to determine whether the information
sought by the Los Angeles Times would threaten to reveal the
identities of officers who have a strong interest in
maintaining anonymity and whose information should therefore
not be subject to disclosure under the CPRA.[33]
The Contra Costa Newspapers
Decision
In Contra Costa Newspapers, reporters
from Contra Costa Newspapers requested the City of Oakland
to provide the names, job titles, and gross salaries of all
City employees who earned $100,000 or more in the fiscal
year 2003-2004, including those employees who earned a base
salary of less than $100,000 but who grossed $100,000 or
more due to overtime income.[34]
Although the City of Oakland previously released such
information from 1996 through 2003 and despite the fact that
such information was previously published in a local
newspaper, the City of Oakland refused to provide the
requested information to the Contra Costa Newspapers
reporters claiming that recent case law, increased concerns
of financial privacy, and opposition to the release by two
unions representing city employees led to a change in
policy.[35]
Contra Costa Newspapers sought judicial
enforcement of its request. At the Superior Court, two
employee unions intervened in the case, the Oakland Police
Officers Association (“Association”) and the International
Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers, Local 21
(“Local 21”). Following a hearing on the matter, the
Superior Court found that the unions and City failed to show
that any privacy interest was violated in disclosure of
salary information and that even if such a privacy right
existed, it would nevertheless be outweighed by the public
policy supporting disclosure and therefore ordered the City
to disclose the requested salary information.[36]
The Superior Court also rejected the Association’s argument
that Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8, making certain
peace officer records confidential and not subject to
disclosure, did not operate to render the names and salary
of peace officers confidential. Local 21 and the
Association sought review by the Court of Appeal. The Court
of Appeal ruled in favor of the newspaper and the Supreme
Court granted review.
As in Los Angeles Times, the question
before the Supreme Court in Contra Costa Newspapers
was whether the requested information was protected pursuant
to an exception under the CPRA or other state or federal
law. Noting the same public policies favoring disclosure
that it had discussed in its Los Angeles Times
decision, the Supreme Court concluded that on balance,
disclosure of salary information of government employees
generally would not constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy.[37]
The Court found that information
should only be considered private “when well-established
social norms recognize the need to maximize individual
control over its dissemination and use to prevent
unjustified embarrassment or indignity.”[38]
Although the Court acknowledged that disclosure of an
individual’s salary may cause discomfort or embarrassment,
the strong public policy supporting transparency outweighed
any privacy expectation a government employee may have in
salary information.[39]
The Court further noted that since 1955, the Attorney
General has opined that the name and salary of public
employees are matters of public record.[40]
The Supreme Court then proceeded
to analyze whether Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8
provide any special protections to peace officers’ names and
salary information. The Court addressed the question of
whether privileged “personal data” as stated in Penal Code
section 832.8 includes names and salary information of peace
officers. Finding that a public employee’s salary relates
to a public interest and not primarily to a private
individual matter of the involved employee, the Court
concluded that the Legislature did not intend the words
“personal data” to be read so broadly as to encompass all
potential information relating to a peace officer, including
name and salary.[41]
The
Court theorized that if the Legislature wanted peace officer
salary information to be confidential, the Legislature could
have added the word “salary” to the statute, noting that
“ordinarily, the enumeration of one item in a statute
implies that the Legislature intended to exclude others.”[42]
Therefore, the Court explained that its holding that that
all public employee names and salary information of
employees earning $100,000 per year or more with overtime is
subject to disclosure applies equally to peace officers.
The Court stated: “we reject the notion that peace officers
in general have a greater privacy interest in the amount of
their salaries than that possessed by other public
employees…”[43]
What is the Current Status of Peace
Officer Personnel Information?
Following Los Angeles Times and Contra Costa
Newspapers, the names, employing departments, and
employment dates of peace officers are all subject to
disclosure. Moreover, salary information for peace officers
earning $100,000 or more per year with overtime is also a
matter of public record.[44]
However, law enforcement agencies nevertheless must engage
in a case-by-case analysis of each CPRA request that is
received to determine whether releasing information is
appropriate.
The first issue is whether the
information sought is the type of information that is
specifically protected by a statute such as Penal Code
sections 832.7 and 832.8. If the information is
specifically protected by a statute, then it is protected
from disclosure under the CPRA. If there is no specific
statutory provision protecting the information, then the
issue becomes whether the information requested is otherwise
protected from disclosure because its disclosure would
result in an unwarranted invasion of privacy.[45]
Moreover, under the CPRA, information may be withheld where
“the public interest served by not disclosing the record
clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure
of the record.”[46]
Indeed, it is crucial to note that even if
information would normally be subject to disclosure under
Los Angeles Times and Contra Costa Newspapers,
there are at least two very important circumstances wherein
disclosure would not necessarily be warranted. Both of
these circumstances were addressed by the Supreme Court in
Los Angeles Times and are outlined below.
First, information may be withheld by a law
enforcement agency if releasing that information would
jeopardize the safety of the peace officer or his or her
family or if releasing the information would negatively
impact the officer’s ability to perform his or her duties
effectively. This scenario may arise in the context of
undercover operations where an officer’s anonymity is
critical to the officer’s safety. The Supreme Court
specifically noted:
"If the duties of a particular officer,
such as one who is operating undercover, demand anonymity,
the need to protect the officer’s safety and effectiveness
certainly would justify the Commission in withholding
information identifying him or her under Government Code
section 6255, subdivision (a), which permits records to be
withheld if “on the facts of the particular case the public
interest served by not disclosing the record clearly
outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the
record.”[47]
For example, if a law enforcement agency can
demonstrate that disclosure of the peace officer’s name
would jeopardize the safety of the officer and/or his or her
family, or if the disclosure would render ineffective the
officer’s ability to perform his or her duties such as in an
undercover capacity, the name of the peace officer may be
withheld under the CPRA.
Second, the identities of peace officers
subject to complaints remain confidential pursuant to
Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court[48]
and may not be disclosed.[49]
Likewise, the names of officers subject to investigation and
discipline are confidential.
Interestingly, in Los Angeles Times,
the Court noted that in its 2006 decision in Copley
Press, it had expressed disapproval of the 1997 finding
by the Court of Appeal in New York
Times Co. v. Superior Court[50]
that: “‘[u]nder
Penal
Code section 832.7 and
832.8,
an individual’s name is not exempt from disclosure.’”[51]
The criticism of the New York Times decision, holding
that a newspaper could learn the names of officers involved
in a shooting, had led some to conclude that the names of
officers were never subject to disclosure under any
circumstances. However, in Los Angeles Times, the
Supreme Court explained that its earlier-expressed
disagreement with the New York Times case was
strictly limited insofar as the New York Times case,
holding that an officer’s name is not confidential, might be
read to suggest that officers’ names could be discovered in
connection with disciplinary matters. It appears that the
Supreme Court has now taken the position in Los Angeles
Times that an officer’s identity is only confidential in
connection with complaints, investigations, and discipline
involving the officer.
This clarification by the Supreme Court is
likely to reignite the debate about the right of the news
media to learn the names of officers involved in critical
incidents such as officer-involved shootings. While some
experts interpreted the Supreme Court’s criticism in
Copley Press of the New York Times case to mean
that agencies could refuse to disclose the names of officers
involved in critical incidents, it now appears that
officers’ names are likely subject to disclosure unless
disclosure would pose a serious threat to officer safety, a
decision to be made on a case-by-case basis. The California
Attorney General is expected to issue an opinion on this
very important issue in the near future.
Conclusion
Following the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Los Angeles Times and Contra Costa
Newspapers, law enforcement agencies can expect to
receive more CPRA requests seeking information about peace
officers. Requests for salary information and
employment-related information are especially likely to
increase. Law enforcement agencies are precariously
situated, being forced to act as guardians of information
peace officers wish to keep private while still complying
with the public’s right to disclosure of certain
information. Given this vital position that law enforcement
agencies and managers occupy, it is incumbent upon agencies
and managers to understand the requirements as well as the
limitations of the high court’s decisions in Los Angeles
Times and Contra Costa Newspapers as well as
other case law impacting peace officer information so
as to avoid claims by peace officers that too much
information is being released and so as to avoid claims by
the public that its right to inspect public records is not
being infringed.
[1]
Government Code section 6250,
et seq.
[2]
Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training v.
Superior Court (Los Angeles Times Comm., L.L.C.)
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 278 (“Los Angeles Times”).
[3]
International Federation of Professional and
Technical Engineers, Local 21, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court
(Contra Costa Newspapers, Inc.) (2007) 42 Cal.4th
319 (“Contra Costa Newspapers”).
[4]
Although the holding was specifically limited to
employees earning over $100,000, the Court’s decision
can reasonably be read to require disclosure of salary
information for any employees regardless of the amount
of salary.
[5]
Government Code section 6250.
[6]
Government Code sections 6253 and 6254.
[7]
Government Code section 6254(k).
[8]
Government Code section 6254(c).
[9]
Penal Code section 832.8.
[10]
Los Angeles Times, 42 Cal.4th at 286. The
reporter also requested the information on dates of
birth so that officers with the same name could be
distinguished, but that request was later withdrawn.
Additionally, the reporter requested information
regarding the reasons for termination of the peace
officers. However, the trial court did not require POST
to disclose this information and the Los Angeles Times
did not challenge that ruling. As such, whether dates
of birth and reasons for termination are required to be
disclosed under the CPRA were not addressed by the
Supreme Court.
[11]
Los Angeles Times, 42 Cal.4th at 286-87.
[12]
Los Angeles Times, 42 Cal.4th at 287.
[13]
Los Angeles Times, 42 Cal.4th at 286.
[14]
Los Angeles Times, 42 Cal.4th at 287.
[15]
Los Angeles Times, 42 Cal.4th at 287.
[16]
Los Angeles Times, 42 Cal.4th at 291.
[17]
Los Angeles Times, 42 Cal.4th at 291.
[18]
Los Angeles Times, 42 Cal.4th at 290.
[19]
Los Angeles Times, 42 Cal.4th at 295.
[20]
Los Angeles Times, 42 Cal.4th at 293.
[21]
Penal Code section 832.8(a).
[22]
Los Angeles Times, 42 Cal.4th at 293-94.
[23]
Los Angeles Times, 42 Cal.4th at 298.
[24]
Los Angeles Times, 42 Cal.4th at 299 (quoting
Government Code section 6254(c)).
[25]
Los Angeles Times, 42 Cal.4th at 299.
[26]
Los Angeles Times, 42 Cal.4th at 300.
[27]
Los Angeles Times, 42 Cal.4th at 301.
[28]
Los Angeles Times, 42 Cal.4th at 301.
[29]
Los Angeles Times, 42 Cal.4th at 301-02.
[30]
Los Angeles Times, 42 Cal.4th at 302. Notably,
in his dissenting opinion, Justice Chin stated that it
is feasible that someone who is hostile towards the
police may use the list of officers’ names to locate
their addresses in order to harass them and their
families. Id. at 317.
[31]
Los Angeles Times, 42 Cal.4th at 303.
[32]
Los Angeles Times, 42 Cal.4th at 303.
[33]
Los Angeles Times, 42 Cal.4th at 303.
[34]
Contra Costa Newspapers, 42 Cal.4th at 327.
[35]
Contra Costa Newspapers, 42 Cal.4th at 327.
[36]
Contra Costa Newspapers, 42 Cal.4th at 328.
[37]
Contra Costa Newspapers, 42 Cal.4th at 330.
[38]
Contra Costa Newspapers, 42 Cal.4th at 330.
[39]
Contra Costa Newspapers, 42 Cal.4th at 331.
[40]
Contra Costa Newspapers, 42 Cal.4th at 331
(quoting State Employees’ Retirement Act (1995)
25 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen 90, 91).
[41]
Contra Costa Newspapers, 42 Cal.4th at 341.
[42]
Contra Costa Newspapers, 42 Cal.4th at 343.
[43]
Contra Costa Newspapers, 42 Cal.4th at 344.
[44]
The status of other types of information, such as
reasons for separation, dates of birth, and salary
information for officers earning less than $100,000 per
year, was technically not addressed by the Supreme Court
in either case for various reasons. However, review of
the Supreme Court’s other decisions in conjunction with
its Los Angeles Times and Contra Costa
Newspapers suggests that information regarding the
reasons for separation would likely still be considered
confidential. There would seem to be little legitimate
public need to know officers’ birth dates.
[45]
Government Code section 6254.
[46]
Government Code section 6255(a).
[47]
Los Angeles Times, 42 Cal.4th at 301.
[48]
Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 39
Cal.4th 1272.
[49]
Los Angeles Times, 42 Cal.4th at 298.
[50]
New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 52
Cal.App.4th 97.
[51]
Los Angeles Times, 42 Cal.4th at 298 (quoting
New York Times, 52 Cal.App.4th at 101).