Gloria Dickerson worked as a Principal Human Resources Administrator at the New Jersey Institute of Technology (NJIT). Dickerson was frequently absent from work on medical leaves, including under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). In July 2018, while Dickerson was on FMLA, she attended a colleague’s retirement party and danced. Upon learning this, Dickerson’s supervisor, Annie Crawford, the Vice President of Human Resources, allegedly remarked to others, “How can you dance on FMLA?” Dickerson claimed this comment was evidence of discrimination based on her disability and alleged that it set off a pattern of harassment, marginalization, and retaliation. Dickerson remained employed for nearly two additional years after the comment, continued to utilize medical leave, received full compensation, and did not suffer a demotion or formal discipline. She was ultimately terminated in July 2020.
In Dickerson’s first lawsuit (Dickerson I), she brought suit against NJIT and Crawford, alleging that the “How can you dance on FMLA?” remark reflected discriminatory animus, created a hostile work environment, and resulted in a retaliatory termination. NJIT moved for summary judgment, arguing that the single comment was insufficient to support a claim under either the ADA or New Jersey’s antidiscrimination law, and that Dickerson could not demonstrate an adverse employment action or causal link between her disability or protected activity and her eventual termination.
The Court agreed. It held that even if the comment was inappropriate or unprofessional, a single offhand remark, unaccompanied by further harassment or tangible changes in job conditions, does not constitute severe or pervasive conduct under the applicable legal standards. The Court noted that Crawford’s comment was to clarify the nature of Dickerson’s condition in light of recent absences. Moreover, Dickerson’s own continued use of FMLA leave for nearly two years after this comment, without any interference or denial of benefits, undermined her claims.
The Court found no evidence that the remark affected her responsibilities, salary, or working conditions. Her hostile work environment claim failed for lack of severity, and her retaliation claim failed because she could not identify any materially adverse employment action connected to her complaint or her medical condition. The Court also dismissed all claims against Ms. Crawford individually, because New Jersey law does not permit individual liability without an underlying violation by the employer.
While the motion for summary judgment was pending in Dickerson I, Dickerson filed a second lawsuit (Dickerson II) against a broader group of NJIT officials. This time, she named NJIT’s Board of Trustees, the University President, General Counsel, and another HR professional as defendants. The allegations in Dickerson II were largely a restatement of the same factual narrative from the first case, with some new language accusing the defendants of treating her “like a slave,” denying her promotions, and subjecting her to a hostile work environment. The new suit added vague references to age discrimination and claimed a deprivation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dickerson filed this second case in 2024, more than four years after her termination.
The Court dismissed Dickerson II in its entirety, with prejudice. First, the Court found that the second lawsuit was barred by the doctrine of res judicata (claim preclusion), which prohibits parties from re-litigating claims that have already been decided or could have been raised in an earlier proceeding. Although Dickerson named new defendants in the second suit, the Court found that they were all agents of NJIT or served in a common legal interest with NJIT. Since the allegations arose from the same set of facts already litigated in Dickerson I, the Court concluded that Dickerson II was simply an attempt to re-litigate issues that had already been dismissed.
The Court also found that Dickerson’s service of the complaint was deficient. She failed to follow the proper procedures for serving summonses on government officials and entities, and even after being given opportunities to correct the deficiency, she did not cure it.
In addition to these procedural defects, the Court held that the complaint in Dickerson II was too vague and conclusory to survive. It did not allege specific discriminatory acts or adverse employment actions, and it failed to plausibly connect the named defendants to any unlawful conduct. Even if her claims were not barred by res judicata, they would still fail on the merits due to lack of factual detail and legal sufficiency.
The Court also ruled that her claims under federal and state law were time-barred. Under both the ADA and New Jersey law, employment discrimination claims must be brought within two years of the alleged adverse action. Dickerson filed her second complaint more than four years after her July 2020 termination, making the entire action untimely.
Dickerson v. New Jersey Institute of Technology (D.N.J. July 29, 2025) 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144802.
Note: This case underscores the importance of handling employee concerns professionally, including when an employee is taking medical leave.