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California Court Enforces Online Arbitration Agreement Where App Gave Users Clear Notice Of Terms Of Service

CATEGORY: Private Education Matters, Public Education Matters
CLIENT TYPE: Private Education, Public Education
DATE: Sep 08, 2026

In Wilkins v. Cruise, LLC, the California Court of Appeal held that an arbitration agreement contained in an online Terms of Service was enforceable because the company’s mobile app gave users sufficiently clear notice that continuing through the account process meant agreeing to those terms. The Court reversed the trial court’s order denying arbitration and directed the trial court to compel the plaintiff’s claims to arbitration.

Gino Wilkins was an employee of Cruise, LLC, an autonomous ride-hailing company. Wilkins was injured while riding in a Cruise autonomous vehicle, but at the time of the accident, he was not working as an employee. Instead, he was using Cruise’s ride-hailing service as a customer. Wilkins sued Cruise and two related General Motors entities for claims including negligence, product liability, and breach of warranty. The defendants sought to require Wilkins to arbitrate his claims based in part on an arbitration provision contained in the Terms of Service associated with his Cruise customer account. The trial court refused to compel arbitration, concluding that Cruise had not sufficiently established that Wilkins agreed to the arbitration provision.

The Court of Appeal disagreed. The Court explained that contracts formed online are subject to the same basic rules as other contracts: users must have adequate notice of the contractual terms, and their actions must demonstrate agreement to those terms. Online agreements can take several forms. Some require a user to affirmatively click an “I agree” button (click-wrap agreement), some require a user to simply browse a site (browse-wrap agreement), while others provide notice that taking another action, such as signing up, signing in, or continuing to the next screen, constitutes agreement to linked terms and conditions (sign-in wrap agreement).

Courts have held that sign-in wrap agreements can be enforceable if the user receives reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms and then takes an action that demonstrates agreement to them. Cruise used this type of sign-in process. During the account process, users encountered a screen stating in bold type: “By continuing, you agree to our Terms & Privacy Policy and confirm you are at least 18 years old.” Immediately below, the screen instructed users to read the Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, with links to both documents displayed in contrasting text. At the bottom of the screen was a prominent button containing an arrow that the user had to press to continue to the next screen.

The Court concluded that this design provided adequate notice. The screen was uncluttered, contained only two sentences, and prominently told users that continuing meant agreeing to Cruise’s Terms of Service. The links to the Terms of Service and Privacy Policy were readily visible and could be accessed with one click. Nothing else on the screen distracted users from the notice. Given this presentation, the Court concluded that a reasonable user would understand that pressing the button to continue meant agreeing to the Terms of Service.

The Court then considered whether the Terms of Service themselves gave users sufficient notice of the arbitration requirement. They did. Near the beginning of the Terms, bold language informed users that the document constituted a legally binding contract and specifically warned that Section 5 contained an arbitration agreement and class action waiver requiring most claims against Cruise to be resolved through individual binding arbitration. The table of contents also identified Section 5 as “Dispute Resolution and Arbitration,” and the arbitration section itself was clearly labeled and formatted consistently with the rest of the document.

Wilkins argued that this was insufficient because, when viewed on a cell phone, the Terms of Service extended across approximately 31 screens, with the initial arbitration warning appearing on the third screen and the arbitration provision itself beginning on the twelfth. The Court rejected this argument. It emphasized that the arbitration provision was not hidden or difficult to identify and that requiring a user to scroll through an electronic agreement did not, by itself, make the terms inaccessible or unenforceable.

The Court also rejected Wilkins’s argument that the arbitration language was ambiguous. Although one subsection stated that either party “may” initiate arbitration if a dispute could not be resolved informally, another expressly stated in bold capital letters that Cruise and the user mutually agreed to resolve disputes exclusively through final and binding individual arbitration. Reading the provisions as a whole, the Court concluded there was no reasonable ambiguity: a user could decide whether to pursue a claim, but if the user chose to do so, the agreed procedure was arbitration.

Finally, the Court rejected the trial court’s alternative conclusion that arbitration should not be required because Wilkins had also sued two related General Motors entities that had not signed the agreement. Wilkins’s own complaint alleged that Cruise and the GM entities were related and acted as agents, joint venturers, or alter egos of one another, and he asserted the same claims based on the same underlying facts against all defendants. The Terms of Service also expressly extended the arbitration provision to Cruise affiliates and related parties. Under those circumstances, the Court concluded that the related GM entities could enforce the arbitration agreement and were not outside “third parties” whose presence would justify denying arbitration.

Accordingly, the Court reversed the order denying arbitration and directed the trial court to grant the defendants’ motions to compel arbitration.

Wilkins v. Cruise, LLC (July 14, 2026, A173832) ___ Cal.App.5th ___.

Note:

Organizations should exercise care when agreeing to terms of use through websites, mobile apps, online registration systems, or other electronic platforms. As this case demonstrates, an organization may be bound by lengthy online terms even if its representative does not actually read them or click a separate “I agree” box. Where the platform provides clear notice that taking an action, such as clicking “continue,” constitutes agreement to linked terms, those terms may be enforceable. Organizations should therefore ensure that employees tasked with contracting for services on behalf of the organization understand that their online actions will bind the organization in the same manner as a contract and can limit an organization’s scope of remedies. Organizations should carefully review terms, including arbitration provisions, before proceeding.

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