Ellenor Zinski, formerly employed as an Information Services Apprentice at Liberty University’s IT Helpdesk, was hired in February 2023. At the time of hiring, she was known as Jonathan Zinski and was assigned male at birth. She performed IT-related tasks, including troubleshooting classroom equipment and assisting students and staff, and consistently received positive performance evaluations.
On July 5, 2023, Zinski informed Liberty’s Human Resources department that she identified as a transgender woman, was undergoing hormone replacement therapy, and intended to legally change her name. She explicitly stated that her gender transition would not affect her work performance and did not request accommodations.
Liberty did not initially respond. Over the next month, Zinski followed up multiple times, experiencing severe anxiety and distress while awaiting an official response. Eventually, on August 8, 2023, she was called to a meeting with Liberty’s Chief Information Officer and the Executive Vice President of Human Resources, where she was handed a letter terminating her employment. The letter stated that her transition violated Liberty’s religious beliefs and doctrinal statement, which affirms a biblical view of sex and gender.
Zinski filed a lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, arguing that Liberty unlawfully terminated her employment due to sex discrimination, as defined by Bostock v. Clayton County (2020), a U.S. Supreme Court case that established that discrimination based on transgender status is a form of sex discrimination.
The parties did not dispute that Liberty dismissed Zinski due to her transgender status. However, Liberty moved to dismiss the case, arguing that various religious exemptions and doctrines allowed it to terminate Zinski based on its faith-based opposition to gender transition.
First, Liberty argued that the religious exceptions under sections 702 and 703 of Title VII applied. These exceptions allow religious institutions to make hiring decisions on the basis of religion. Liberty argued that the decision to fire Zinski was religious discrimination, protected under Title VII’s exceptions, rather than sex discrimination. The Court rejected this argument, holding that while religious employers may base hiring decisions on religious preferences, Title VII does not exempt them from prohibitions against sex discrimination. Citing Bostock v. Clayton County, the Court emphasized that discrimination against transgender employees is inherently sex-based and thus unlawful under Title VII.
The University also invoked the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), claiming that enforcing Title VII would substantially burden its religious exercise. The Court found RFRA inapplicable, as it only applies when the government—not a private party—is involved. Even if RFRA did apply, the Court reasoned that Title VII would likely pass strict scrutiny because of the government’s compelling interest in preventing workplace discrimination. The Court rejected Liberty’s argument that allowing Zinski to remain employed would force the University to endorse beliefs contrary to its faith. Instead, the Court found that the law did not require Liberty to affirm or adopt Zinski’s gender identity—only to refrain from unlawful discrimination in employment decisions.
Liberty next contended that the ministerial exception, a doctrine that exempts religious institutions from certain employment discrimination claims when hiring or firing ministers, barred Zinski’s claim, arguing that all its employees were expected to uphold religious doctrine. The Court rejected this defense, too, finding that Zinski’s IT role was purely secular and lacked the religious responsibilities required to qualify as a ministerial position.
The University also invoked the First Amendment’s expressive association doctrine, which is a principle that protects an organization’s right to associate (or not associate) with individuals if forced association would significantly interfere with the group’s ability to express its message. Here, Liberty argued that employing Zinski would compromise its religious message. The Court distinguished this case from Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, where the Supreme Court found that requiring a private organization to retain a gay scoutmaster interfered with its messaging. Because Zinski had no teaching or public-facing role in shaping Liberty’s religious beliefs, the Court concluded that her presence would not impair the University’s ability to express its faith-based views.
Finally, Liberty argued that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, which bars courts from adjudicating disputes over religious doctrine, precluded judicial review of its employment decision. The Court disagreed, clarifying that while religious institutions have autonomy over theological matters, courts may enforce neutral laws, including Title VII. Since the case involved employment discrimination rather than an internal church dispute, the doctrine did not apply.
Finding that none of the defenses applied, the Court denied Liberty’s motion to dismiss and allowed Zinski’s complaint to proceed.
Zinski v. Liberty Univ., Inc. (W.D.Va. Feb. 21, 2025) 2025 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 31362.
Note: This court’s decision underscores that while religious institutions enjoy certain legal protections, including the religious exception to Title VII, they remain subject to Title VII’s prohibition on sex-based discrimination, which can extend to discrimination against transgender employees.