In 2019, the California Legislature passed AB 218, which expanded the definition of childhood sexual abuse and extended the statute of limitations for commencing civil suits. The law extended the statute of limitations by 14 years, allowing a plaintiff to bring actions within 22 years of reaching the age of majority. The bill thereby opened a window allowing plaintiffs to make claims for abuse from the 1960s, as was the case in R.L. v. Merced City School District.
Plaintiff R.L. sued Merced City School District, claiming that the District’s and its employees’ negligent acts and or omissions proximately caused his childhood sexual assault and resulted in injuries.
R.L. attended an elementary school within the Merced City School District from 1964 to 1970. R.L. alleged that during his time as an elementary school student, the District employed the perpetrator as the principal and allowed the perpetrator to have regular unsupervised contact with R.L. and his minor peers. Specifically, R.L. alleged that the perpetrator used his position to groom R.L. and his peers. He bought R.L. gifts, including a bike and clothing, and drove R.L. to school. R.L. alleged that at age seven, when R.L. was in first or second grade, the perpetrator began to sexually assault him at school.
R.L. alleged that the perpetrator would lock his office door and sexually assault R.L. in his office. R.L. further alleged that the faculty, and in particular the secretaries and administrative office staff, either knew or suspected the perpetrator’s sexual assault of minor students.
R.L. raised four causes of action: (1) negligence; (2) negligent hiring, retention, and supervision of an unfit employee; (3) negligent supervision of a minor; and (4) negligent failure to warn, train, and educate.
The District filed a demurrer, arguing that R.L.’s causes of action must be dismissed for failure to comply with the Government Claim Requirement of Government Code sections 911.2 and 945.4. The District further argued that AB 218’s significant changes to Government Code section 905 violated the gift clause.
The superior court entered an order sustaining the District’s challenge to the sufficiency of the complaint without leave to amend the complaint. The order states that R.L.’s causes of action failed to comply with the Government Claim Requirements. The District Court further stated that “legislation changing the statute of limitation for an offense did not alter the deadline for filing a claim against a public entity.”
R.L. appealed the superior court’s decision, arguing that it erroneously sustained the District’s demurrer in light of AB 218, which revives claims that did not satisfy the Government Claims Act. The District argued that AB 218’s retroactive waiver of the claims presentation requirement for these claims violated Article XVI, section 6 of the California Constitution, more commonly known as the gift clause.
The gift clause states that “the legislature shall have no power … to make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, or any public money or thing of value to any individual.” The gift clause denies the legislature the right to make direct appropriations of public money for private purposes. This prevents the legislature from giving public money to individuals from general considerations of charity or “some moral or equitable obligation.” However, if the money is for a public purpose, the appropriation is not a gift even though private persons are benefited.
The gift clause prohibits the legislature from creating any liability or cause of action where none existed before. The appellate court, therefore, had to determine if the defendant’s alleged acts or omissions violated a duty or obligation that was already imposed by a preexisting law.
The Government Claims Act, which established procedures to sue the government for tort claims and extended vicarious liability to public entities, was enacted in 1963. R.L. alleged he was sexually assaulted at his elementary school by his principal on a continuous basis (and that the faculty was aware of these incidents) between 1965–1969. Therefore, the appellate court determined that the statutory provisions imposing vicarious public entity liability for a public employee’s negligence existed at the time of the alleged assault.
Furthermore, the appellate court decided that AB 218’s retroactive waiving of the claim presentation requirement, which extended the timely presentation of a claim, and the statute of limitations did not create a new liability or cause of action but simply removed an obstacle to recovery imposed by the state.
The appellate court therefore concluded that AB 218’s retroactive waiver of the Government Claims Act’s claim presentation requirement does not violate the gift clause and reversed the judgment of dismissal.
R.L. v. Merced City School Dist. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 89.