Preston Damsky, a law student at the University of Florida, became a source of controversy on campus after classmates and faculty raised concerns about the content of two seminar papers he wrote and a subsequent series of posts he made on X (formerly Twitter). The papers, submitted for graded coursework, advanced provocative and racially charged political arguments and ended with language some readers interpreted as suggesting violent resistance. Although the papers upset many students, the law school initially declined to discipline him, concluding after review that the writings were protected speech and did not constitute true threats.
The following semester, student anxiety about Damsky continued, and administrators met with him to discuss the impact of his rhetoric. Matters escalated on March 21, 2025, when Damsky posted on X that “Jews must be abolished by any means necessary,” referencing a Harvard professor’s academic argument as the conceptual basis for his statement. One week later, a Jewish law professor responded publicly, asking whether Damsky was “saying [he] would murder me and my family.” Damsky replied with further rhetorical commentary about the professor’s question and the academic debate he believed he was referencing. While the professor initially said she was not personally alarmed, many students and several faculty members expressed significant fear. Some students cried in administrators’ offices, reported feeling unsafe attending class with him, and worried he might bring a weapon to campus, even though the record showed no evidence that Damsky had made threats, suggested violent intent, or possessed weapons.
On April 2, the University suspended Damsky, barred him from campus, and increased police presence at certain events. It later charged Damsky with “disruptive conduct” and “harassment” under the Student Conduct Code, using his two seminar papers and the X posts as primary evidence. A disciplinary board recommended expulsion, which the Dean of Students adopted. In the expulsion letter, the Dean characterized the writings and posts as threatening and disruptive, notwithstanding that the Code explicitly excluded First Amendment–protected speech from those definitions. After an unsuccessful administrative appeal, the expulsion became final.
Damsky filed suit in federal court, alleging the University violated the First Amendment by expelling him for protected speech, and moved for a preliminary injunction ordering his reinstatement. To succeed on a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must show: (1) a substantial likelihood he will succeed on the merits; (2) that he will suffer irreparable harm without a preliminary injunction; (3) that his threatened injury outweighs harm the injunction may inflict on the University; and (4) that a preliminary injunction would not disserve the public interest.
In light of this framework, the Court granted the preliminary injunction. The judge concluded that Damsky had shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits because the University had not demonstrated that any of his speech fell into an unprotected category such as “true threats” or incitement. The Court emphasized that, even though deeply offensive, his statements did not express a serious intent to commit unlawful violence, nor were they directed at a specific person in a manner that conveyed an imminent threat. The context, including his explicit reference to an academic theorist, reinforced that his posts reflected extreme political commentary rather than actionable threats.
The Court also rejected the University’s argument that the speech was punishable under Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, a Supreme Court case that recognized that the special characteristics of the school environment allow schools to regulate certain categories of expressions inappropriate for that setting. Here, the Court reasoned that the student speech cannot be restricted merely because it deeply upsets peers or leads to heightened administrative concern; rather, Tinker permits regulation only when speech is reasonably construed as a school-directed threat or causes an actual material and substantial disruption. Here, the disruption stemmed largely from others’ reactions and the University’s own response, not from the speech itself.
Because the University directly penalized protected expression, the Court found that Damsky established irreparable harm; being excluded from campus and classes because of protected speech is itself a continuing constitutional injury. The Court further concluded that the balance of harms and public-interest factors weighed heavily in favor of an injunction, noting that protecting expressive freedom serves the public interest, while the University had no legitimate interest in enforcing unconstitutional restrictions. The Court ordered the University to reinstate him to normal standing by December 1, 2025, conditioned on the posting of a bond.
Damsky v. Summerlin (N.D. Fla. Nov. 24, 2025) No. 1:25-cv-275.
Note: Although this case involved a public university, it is a useful reminder for California private high schools covered by the Leonard Law, which prohibits disciplining students for speech that would be protected by the First Amendment.