Former Los Angeles County Sheriff Alex Villanueva attempted to settle an employment litigation involving a deputy sheriff. He directed the reinstatement of the deputy with back pay and benefits. The County filed a writ petition challenging Villanueva’s settlement directive as void and illegal because it was not approved by the Board of Supervisors or County Counsel.
The County Counsel sent Villanueva a letter notifying him that the Board had agreed to offer him conflict counsel on the question of whether the Sheriff had authority under the Los Angeles County Charter to settle the deputy’s employment action without approvals from the County Counsel and the Board. The letter informed the Sheriff that pursuant to California Government Code section 31000.6(a), the Board would provide the Sheriff independent legal counsel for that sole issue. The letter noted that the Sheriff could select his own counsel, but the Board had the discretion to pay only the compensation the Board deemed just and proper.
Villanueva selected Quinn Emanuel (Quinn) as his independent legal counsel. Quinn then sent the Sheriff a retainer agreement that quoted billing rates ranging from $695 to $1,400 an hour and contained an arbitration clause. The following day, the County Counsel’s office emailed Quinn a letter regarding a “retainer agreement.” The letter stated: the Board would determine the appropriate hourly rate; the County would pay a blended rate for attorneys of $495 an hour; and other terms and conditions.
Villanueva chose to sign the Quinn engagement letter without obtaining approval from County Counsel. When Quinn did not sign the County’s retainer agreement, the County Counsel’s office sent repeated communications stating the need to sign the County’s retainer agreement for Quinn to be paid. Quinn rejected the County Counsel’s retainer agreement and stated the County Counsel was conflicted and should have no involvement.
The County filed an ex parte application, citing Government Code section 31000.6, that asked the court to remove Quinn as counsel of record. The judge denied the application, finding that the section provided no procedure for such relief. But, the judge also stated that there was no contract between the Board and Quinn, and Quinn could not be paid with County funds until a contract was made.
In January 2020, Quinn substituted out of the case. In February 2020, Quinn sent the Sheriff an invoice for services for $1,740,001.70. The County did not pay Quinn.
Next, Quinn served the County, the Sheriff, and the Sheriff’s Department with a demand for arbitration at JAMS, based on arbitration provisions in the engagement agreement that Villanueva signed. The County responded with a lawsuit for declaratory relief. The County plaintiffs (the County, the Sheriff’s Department, and Villanueva in his official capacity) sought a declaration that there was no valid agreement to arbitrate, nor a valid contract with any County plaintiff to represent the Sheriff. The County’s lawsuit also sought to enjoin the pending arbitration and to require Quinn to withdraw the arbitration demand.
The trial court granted the County’s motion for preliminary injunction. The County then filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the County’s motion, finding no triable issues of fact as to whether the County entered into a fee agreement with Quinn, and that the Sheriff lacked the authority to enter into the Quinn agreement.
After the summary judgment hearing, but before the judgment was entered, Quinn filed a motion for leave to file a cross-complaint for breach of contract and related claims, contending leave should be granted to avoid forfeiture of “compulsory cross-claims.”
The County opposed Quinn’s motion to file a cross-complaint, and the court denied it. The court then entered judgment for the County plaintiffs and against Quinn as to all causes of action contained in the County’s complaint, permanently enjoining the arbitration and ordering Quinn to withdraw its demand.
Undeterred, Quinn filed a new lawsuit against the County, the Sheriff’s Department, and Villanueva in his official capacity. The complaint alleged the same causes of action as Quinn had alleged in the arbitration and in its proposed cross-complaint in the County’s declaratory relief action. The County demurred, contending each cause of action was barred by the Government Claims Act, forfeited under the “compulsory counterclaim” statute, and unsupported by sufficient facts to state a valid claim as a matter of law. The trial court sustained the County’s demurrer without leave to amend.
Quinn timely appealed both cases. The California Court of Appeal consolidated the appeals for oral argument and decision. The Court framed the cases as a dispute centered around the distinction between the Sheriff’s authority to select independent counsel versus his authority to retain independent counsel. The Court of Appeal concluded that the Sheriff did not have the authority to retain Quinn. The Court found that: summary judgment for the County plaintiffs in their declaratory relief action was proper; there was no error in the court’s denial of Quinn’s belated motion for leave to file a cross-complaint in that action; and Quinn’s subsequent lawsuit against the County was properly dismissed on demurrer on either of two grounds: because it was a compulsory cross-complaint in the earlier declaratory relief action or because Quinn failed to allege compliance with the presentation requirements of the Government Claims Act. The Court affirmed both the judgment in the County’s action and the order of dismissal in Quinn’s action.
County of Los Angeles v. Quinn Emanuel, 115 Cal.App.5th 489 (2025).