Students at Florida International University (“FIU”) formed a student organization called ICEBreakers to oppose an agreement authorizing FIU police officers to exercise certain federal immigration enforcement powers. In March 2026, approximately 15 students wearing matching “ICE OFF FIU” T-shirts attended an indoor event at which FIU’s President was interviewing a former professional athlete. During the interview, the students silently stood and faced the audience for approximately one to three minutes before leaving the auditorium. They did not speak or carry signs, and the interview continued without interruption. According to the evidence before the Court, no attendee complained about the protest at the time.
FIU nevertheless initiated disciplinary proceedings against several students under a University regulation prohibiting “protests, parades, marches, picketing, demonstrations, and other similar expressive activities” inside University buildings. The University’s own investigation produced evidence that the protest had not disrupted the event: the staff member overseeing the event reported that the speakers continued their discussion and that no attendees complained. FIU did not charge the students with disruptive conduct, but instead disciplined them for violating the blanket prohibition on indoor expressive activity.
Following disciplinary hearings, six students received written reprimands and were required to submit two-minute “video reflections” explaining their understanding of FIU’s speech rules and how they would comply going forward. Failure to submit an acceptable video could result in a hold preventing a student from registering for classes or obtaining financial aid, transcripts, a diploma, or other academic records. The students and ICEBreakers sued and sought a preliminary injunction prohibiting FIU from enforcing the indoor-speech rule against them.
The federal district court granted the preliminary injunction, concluding that the students were substantially likely to establish that FIU’s policy violated the First Amendment. The Court relied principally on Tinker v. Des Moines, a 1969 Supreme Court case where a group of students wore black armbands at school to voice their objections to the Vietnam War. In Tinker, the Supreme Court found that schools generally may restrict student expression when it materially disrupts school operations, causes substantial disorder, or invades the rights of others. The Court emphasized that neither a generalized fear of disruption nor the discomfort that accompanies an unpopular viewpoint is sufficient.
The Court also discussed the Supreme Court’s more recent decision in Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L., where several students and coaches were upset after a student posted on Snapchat criticizing the school and school’s cheerleading team, using vulgar language and gestures. In that case, the Court found that a group of cheerleaders being upset and the approximately five to ten minutes of classroom discussion about the social media posts did not satisfy Tinker’s demanding substantial-disruption standard. Likewise, Eleventh Circuit precedent establishes that disagreement with student expression, hostile reactions by other students, or a theoretical possibility of discord generally will not justify suppressing the speaker’s expression.
FIU’s policy was problematic because it did not distinguish between disruptive and nondisruptive indoor expression. While FIU’s rules expressly permitted outdoor expressive activities unless they materially and substantially disrupted University operations or infringed on others’ rights, its indoor rule prohibited covered expressive activity categorically. As the Court observed, the policy was broad enough potentially to reach conduct as limited as a single student wearing a protest button or a small group of students gathering in the student union to discuss their opposition to an issue.
The Court acknowledged that location still matters when determining whether student expression is disruptive. For example, 50 students chanting and clapping might be unobjectionable on an outdoor lawn but materially disruptive inside a classroom. What FIU could not do, however, was presume that all indoor protest activity was disruptive simply because of where it occurred. Even indoors, the relevant question remained whether the particular expression caused, or was reasonably likely to cause, a material and substantial disruption.
Because FIU’s regulation prohibited indoor expressive activity without regard to whether it materially disrupted University operations, the Court found that the students were likely to prevail on their First Amendment claim. It preliminarily prohibited FIU from enforcing the regulation against the individual students and other members of ICEBreakers while the litigation proceeds. The Court did not reach the students’ separate arguments that the policy was an unconstitutional content-based restriction or facially overbroad.
Icebreakers v. Nuñez (S.D.Fla. Aug. 23, 2026) 2026 WL 2468485.)
Note: Although this case involves a public university, its analysis is particularly relevant to California private high schools because the Leonard Law (Education Code section 48950) generally prohibits private secondary schools from disciplining a high school student solely for speech that would be protected from governmental restriction if engaged in off campus. Schools may still adopt reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions and address disruptive conduct, but this case is a useful reminder to consider the actual or reasonably anticipated disruption before disciplining a student for protest activity.