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Students Challenge Colleges’ Early Decision Practices as an Agreement Not to Compete
Four current and former college students filed a proposed class action against 32 private colleges and universities, alleging that the schools conspired to restrain competition through their Early Decision (“ED”) admissions practices in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The students also sued the Consortium on Financing Higher Education (“COFHE”), as well as the Common Application and Scoir, two college application platforms.
Under the ED process, a student applies early to one college and agrees to attend if admitted. Unlike Early Action programs, which allow accepted students to continue applying elsewhere and ultimately choose among competing offers, ED requires an accepted applicant to withdraw other applications. Although the Court noted that the student’s ED commitment is not itself legally binding, the Common Application’s ED agreement expressly advises applicants that their names and early commitments may be shared with other institutions.
The plaintiffs do not contend that an individual college violates antitrust law simply by offering ED. Instead, they challenge what they characterize as a separate agreement among competing schools not to compete for students once another institution has admitted them through ED. According to the complaint, participating colleges share information about ED admits and agree not to recruit, admit, or make competing offers to those students. The plaintiffs allege that certain Ivy League institutions formalized this practice through a joint statement requiring participating schools to honor ED commitments made to other colleges, while other schools followed essentially the same practice.
The students contend that this alleged agreement has important financial consequences. An ED applicant cannot compare competing offers or use an offer from another institution to negotiate additional financial aid. According to the complaint, that makes ED particularly valuable to colleges because it identifies students willing to commit without knowing whether another school might offer a lower net price or a more favorable combination of grants and loans. The plaintiffs allege that the resulting reduction in competition allows colleges to provide less financial aid and contributes to higher tuition not only for ED applicants, but throughout the broader market.
The Court declined to dismiss the antitrust claim against the 32 schools. At this early stage of litigation, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged an agreement among competing institutions. As direct evidence, the Court pointed to the Ivy League Joint Statement, under which member institutions agreed to honor another college’s ED commitment. Although only five defendants were parties to that statement, the Court concluded that allegations that other schools engaged in substantially identical conduct could support an inference that the agreement extended further.
The Court also found sufficient circumstantial evidence of coordination among the schools. The complaint alleges that the schools use nearly identical ED processes and that schools have exchanged lists of ED admits to identify students committed elsewhere. For example, the complaint alleges that Dartmouth acknowledged sending ED admission lists to other Ivy League schools and that an Amherst admissions official confirmed sharing such lists with approximately 30 colleges. Once those lists were received, the plaintiffs allege, competing institutions terminated pending applications from students who had been admitted ED elsewhere.
The Court also found the alleged financial incentives relevant. According to the plaintiffs, ED students pay more on average, and an individual school acting independently ordinarily would have little reason to stop competing for a highly qualified applicant, particularly one likely to pay full tuition, simply because another school had already admitted the student. The Court concluded that these allegations supported a plausible inference that the schools were coordinating rather than independently adopting similar admissions practices.
The colleges argued that ED also produces legitimate benefits, including giving students an earlier admissions decision and potentially increasing their likelihood of admission to a preferred institution. The Court did not reject those arguments, but concluded that determining whether the alleged agreement’s benefits outweigh its anticompetitive effects requires a more developed factual record and should not be resolved on a motion to dismiss. The students’ antitrust claims against the schools therefore may proceed.
The Court reached a different result for the Common Application, Scoir, and COFHE. Although those organizations allegedly provided the infrastructure through which colleges communicated or administered admissions, the complaint did not sufficiently allege that any of them actually joined the alleged conspiracy. The Court therefore dismissed the claims against all three organizations.
D’Amico v. Consortium on Fin. Higher Educ. (D.Mass. Aug. 7, 2026) __F.Supp.3d__ [2026 WL 2279510]
Note: This case is a useful reminder that private schools are not insulated from antitrust laws when they collaborate with other schools. Schools should exercise caution when sharing applicant information or coordinating admissions, tuition, financial aid, enrollment, or other competitively sensitive practices with peer schools, particularly where an agreement could limit families’ choices or reduce competition among schools.