On November 10, 2025, the California Supreme Court issued an opinion holding that a California Penal Code section that criminalized “knowingly false” complaints of peace officer misconduct and requiring a complainant alleging misconduct against a peace officer sign an advisory acknowledging that filing a knowingly false complaint may result in criminal prosecution against the complainant violates the First Amendment.
Factual Background
Under California law, law enforcement agencies are mandated to investigate personnel complaints against their peace officer employees. (Penal Code § 832.5; Galzinski v. Somers (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1167.) Recognizing that members of the public can sometimes file baseless complaints to trigger an investigation, since 1995 Penal Code section 148.6(a) has made it a crime, i.e., a misdemeanor, to knowingly file false allegation of misconduct against a peace officer and also requires every complainant to sign an advisory that informs the complainant that filing a knowingly false complaint may result in criminal prosecution. This advisory, codified in section 148.6(a)(2), informs complainants they have a right to file a complaint, even if there is not enough evidence to warrant action on the complaint, but warns that it is against the law to make a complaint known to be false.
Until 2013, the City of Los Angeles was party to a consent decree in the federal district court that prohibited the City from requiring complainants to sign the advisory required by Penal Code section 148.6. When the consent decree expired, the City voluntarily continued the practice of not requiring complainants to sign the advisory. The union representing the City’s police officers, the Los Angeles Police Protective League (“LAPPL”), filed a lawsuit that sought an injunction in California state court to require the City to comply with the advisory requirement in section 148.6(a)(2) for complaints of officer misconduct.
Procedural Background
This case arose from dueling interpretations of Penal Code section 148.6 between the California Supreme Court and the federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on whether the advisory requirement violates the First Amendment or not. The First Amendment prevents the government from discriminating against speech because of its content or message unless the government can show its regulation of that speech is constitutionally justified. Section 148.6 treats knowingly false misconduct complaints against peace officers differently from similar complaints of misconduct against other public professions, such as teachers or firefighters. Both cases applied the same U.S. Supreme Court First Amendment precedent, but reached opposite conclusions.
On one side, the California Supreme Court held in the 2002 case People v. Stanistreet that Penal Code section 148.6 did not violate the First Amendment because California law requires enforcement agencies investigate complaints of peace officer misconduct and therefore filing knowingly false complaints of misconduct creates a drain on public resources. The Stanistreet Court found section 148.6’s special treatment of peace officer misconduct complaints was a constitutionally permissible type of content-based restriction.
On the other side, the Ninth Circuit held in the 2005 case Chaker v. Crogan that Penal Code section 148.6 did violate the First Amendment because it criminalized false allegations of officer misconduct, but not false witness statements that supported the officer’s conduct. The Ninth Circuit found that singling out only false complaints against officers for criminal punishment was a type of unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.
In addition to an injunction preventing the City from accepting an allegation of misconduct without section 148.6’s advisory, the Police Protective League sought a declaration that section 148.6(a)(2) was legally valid and enforceable. At the trial court level, the City responded to the injunction request by arguing section 148.6 violated the First Amendment under Chaker and the Police Protective League’s requested injunction should be denied. The trial court found the California Supreme Court’s decision in Stanistreet determined section 148.6 was constitutional, valid, and enforceable, and issued an injunction requiring the City to comply with the advisory requirement in section 148.6(a)(2).
The City appealed, but the California Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. It noted that the reasoning explained in Stanistreet applies to the advisory requirement, notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Chaker. However, it acknowledged the City was caught between complying with the state court’s injunction or enforcing a statute the federal courts found unconstitutional and unenforceable.
The issues before the California Supreme Court were (1) whether the advisory requirement violated the First Amendment, (2) whether the advisory requirement was an impermissible burden on the ability to file, or on the City to accept, police misconduct complaints, and (3) whether the City could be compelled to follow a statute that the Ninth Circuit held was unconstitutional.
The California Supreme Court’s Decision
In its November 10, 2025 decision, the California Supreme Court held both section 148.6’s criminal provision (Penal Code § 148.6(a)(1)) and its accompanying advisory requirement (Penal Code § 148.6(a)(2)) unconstitutionally burdened protected speech by deterring citizens from filing truthful complaints of misconduct.
The Court explained that the Stanistreet decision may have been sound based on the law at the time, but the U.S. Supreme Court has since clarified the First Amendment principles at issue in a way that undermined Stanistreet’s reasoning. Content-based restrictions on speech, such as singling out knowingly false complaints against polices officers for criminal prosecution, violate the First Amendment if they unduly burden speech.
The Court noted the criminal liability imposed by section 148.6 creates greater First Amendment deterrence effects, and that the special treatment afforded to law enforcement, but not other government officials, implicates the fundamental First Amendment value to criticize public officials and expose their wrongdoing. Following the reasoning in Chaker, the Court further highlighted the asymmetry of criminalizing knowingly false complaints filed against law enforcement, but leaving unregulated knowingly false claims that a witness might make during any ensuing investigation.
As to the advisory admonition, the Court stated it effectively told potential complainants that if they wanted to submit a complaint against a peace officer, they must first sign an acknowledgement that they can be charged with a crime if the law enforcement agency receiving the complaint thinks the complainant is being knowingly untruthful about the allegations of misconduct. In the Court’s view, the “entire point of the admonition is to deter” and when combined with the threat of criminal prosecution, section 148.6 creates a “meaningful risk of deterring . . . well-intentioned reports of police misconduct.”
Recognizing the California legislature has a significant interest in deterring knowingly false complaints of misconduct against police officers, the Court found the way section 148.6 sought to accomplish that goal unnecessarily chills truthful or well-intentioned complaints. The state Supreme Court held that the language of the statute created uncertainty and confusion regarding what might constitute “misconduct” or that the knowingly false statement in a complaint has to be material to the allegations at issue. Instead, the Legislature could have adopted less speech-deterring ways to protect peace officers from false complaints, such as providing heightened procedural protections to insulate them from the potentially damaging professional effects of false complaints, or more precisely defining what form of allegations could trigger criminal liability.
Key Takeaways for Law Enforcement Agencies
The California Supreme Court’s decision means that Penal Code section 148.6 is unconstitutional and unenforceable. More specifically, law enforcement agencies may not attempt to enforce section 148.6’s advisory requirement when receiving formal complaints of peace officer misconduct.
Additionally, law enforcement agencies cannot seek criminal prosecution in the event an agency receives a complaint that may have been submitted with knowingly false allegations. Law enforcement agencies should review and revise their policies regarding personnel complaint reporting procedures to ensure that they comply with the Supreme Court’s November 10, 2025 LAPPL decision.